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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AMERICAN
LEGION PLAN TO PERPETUATE PEACE*
PAUL V. McNuTT, RALPH T. O'NEIL, C. B. ROBBINS
THE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SUPPLY ITS OWN NEEDS
The power of the government to fix fair prices for services or
commodities that are required by the government itself in the
carrying on of a war cannot be questioned. It is true that the
Federal Constitution confers no express power of eminent do-
main. Long ago, however, it was expressly decided that the
government has the power of eminent domain whenever it may
be necessary to acquire property for the purpose of carrying
* The popularly named "Universal Draft" bill espoused by the American
Legion was the occasion of extended hearings before the War Policies
Commission in March, 1931. During those hearings many questions were
raised concerning the powers of the Congress and of the President. The
material of this article was incorporated in a memorandum prepared and
filed in response to those questions by Mr. McNutt, Mr. O'Neil and Colonel
Robbins, acting on behalf of the American Legion. Mr. McNutt and Mr.
O'Neil are Past National Commanders of the Legion and are members of
the Indiana and Nebraska bars, respectively. Colonel Robbins is Chairman
of the National Defense Committee, former Assistant Secretary of War,
and a member of the Iowa bar.
The proposed bill which raises the problems discussed in this article is
as follows:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that in the event
of war, declared by Congress to exist, which in the judgment of the Presi-
dent demands the increase of the Military and/or Naval establishment, the
President be, and he hereby is, authorized to draft into the service of the
405
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out governmental functions. In Kohl v. United States,' the
Supreme Court said that such power in the Federal government
"is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be
preserved if the obstinacy of a private person, or of any other authority,
can prevent the acquisition of the means or instruments by which alone the
governmental functions can be performed. The powers vested by the Con-
stitution in the general government demand for their exercise the acquisi-
tion of lands in all the States. These are needed for forts, armories and
arsenals, for navy-yards and light-houses, for custom-houses, post-offices,
and court-houses, and for other public uses. If the right to acquire prop-
erty for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of
property holders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to
the Federal government, the constitutional grants of power may be ren-
dered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence
upon the will of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen. This can-
not be."
There is a wilderness of authority supporting this essential
power of sovereignty, and none to the contrary. A few of them
are as found in the notes.2
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to declare
war, . . . to raise and support Armies, . . . to provide
and maintain a Navy, . . . to suppress Insurrection and
repel Invasions, . . . and to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
United States such members of the unorganized militia as he may deem
necessary.
Section 2. That in case of such war, or when the President shall judge
the same to be imminent, he is authorized and it shall be his duty when,
in his opinion, such emergency requires it-
(a) To determine and proclaim the material resources and/or industrial
organization (and/or services) over which government control is necessary
or appropriate to the successful termination of such emergency, and such
control shall be exercised by him through agencies then existing or which
he may create for such purposes;
(b) To take such steps as may be necessary to stabilize prices of all
commodities (and/or of services) declared to be necessary or appropriate,
whether such commodities (and/or services) are required by the govern-
ment or by the civilian population.
Section 3. That the President be, and he hereby is, authorized to estab-
lish immediately such agencies as may be necessary to carry into effect,
when the emergency requires it, the powers granted by this Act.
I Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367.
2 United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; Cherokee Nation v. South Kan-
sas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525;
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668; Chappell v.
United States, 160 U. S. 499.
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Powers.' 3 Wars cannot be conducted without soldiers and sail-
ors, who are clothed, fed, armed and transported. The acquisi-
tion of equipment, clothing, food, and munitions of war, is there-
fore an inseparable ingredient of war, and the government has
ample power, under the cited cases, to commandeer, for a fair
price, all such commodities as it may require for that purpose.
Whether the government may determine what is a "fair price,"
or whether it must be done by appraisers or by a jury, as is
usual in condemnation proceedings in time of peace, is covered
by the succeeding portions of this article.
This power of eminent domain is comprehensive, and the gov-
ernment may select its own markets. When the government
buys flour for its armies, in time of peace, it buys flour from
such millers as it cares to. It has the same power in time of war.
Neither the Constitution nor the laws require that the govern-
ment must buy some flour from all millers. We are not advised
that such question has ever been raised, excepting as it was sug-
gested at the hearings before the Commission; but the uniform
practice of the Federal government during all of the wars in
which this government has been engaged, and the uniform prac-
tice of national, state, county and city governments in time of
peace, support the proposition that the government is not obli-
gated to distribute its purchases among all the purveyors of a
particular commodity.
The National Defense Act 4 authorizes the President to pur-
chase all the commodities required by the government for a com-
pensation that is fair and just, and further authorizes the Presi-
dent, in case the owner declines to sell at a reasonable price, to
take immediate possession of his properties and proceed to
manufacture such commodities. The Act further provides that
any owner who shall refuse, shall be guilty of a felony.
Since the present statutes make provision for the acquisition
of such commodities and supplies as the government may re-
quire, and since no question of the validity of that statute has,
or in our judgment, can be raised, further discussion is unneces-
sary. We turn, then, to the question of the power ofthe govern-
ment to fix prices of all commodities which may be required by
the civilian population during time of war.
3 Art. I, See. 8.
4 Tit., 50 U. S. C. A., Secs. 80, 82.
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THE POWER TO FIX PRICES OF COMMODITIES REQUIRED BY
CIVMIANS
The committee further assumes that the price fixed by gov-
ernmental authority will be sufficient to pay for the cost of the
product, plus a reasonable profit. It has been the policy of this
government, in time of war, to commandeer the services of its
soldiers and sailors, and to provide them with clothing and food.
In addition to that, it has compensated them in cash for their
services. The American Legion is in favor of that principle.
It is the belief of The American Legion that the same principle
should be applied to capital, that is, it should be paid a living
wage in the shape of a return for its use of somewhere in the
immediate neighborhood of 6 percent per annum. The abstract
question, suggested at the hearings, as to whether the govern-
ment has power to exact the use of capital during war without
any return, will therefore not be discussed.5
The precise question which will be discussed in this brief is,
Does Congress have the power, without amendment of our Con-
stitution, to require that the profits of those engaged in the fur
nishing of raw material, or in the manufacture thereof, or in the
distribution of the manufactured product at wholesale and retail,
be limited to a reasonable return on the capital invested? Or,
to put it more concretely, is there power in Congress to prohibit
a miller or a baker from exacting a profit in excess of 6 percent
on flour or bread which he may sell for civilian consumption?
The Federal government being one of limited powers, any
constitutional inquiry must first start with the question of
whether or not the power sought to be exercised has been dele-
gated by the Constitution. If that question is answered in the
affirmative, the second question is, whether the exercise of the
power violates any of the constitutional rights of a citizen.
Congress has the express power to carry on a war. The Con-
stitution itself authorizes Congress to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the war
power. During the first thirty years of the history of this coun-
5 The Supreme Court has twice held, very recently, that even in time of
war the government must pay a "just compensation" for property taken
over for war purposes. International Paper Co. v. United States, 282
U. S. 399; Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481. A
"just compensation" must be predicated upon the value of the property
taken.
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try, there was a sharp clash between those who believed in a
strict construction of constitutional powers, and those who
believed in a liberal construction. The question came to a head
in 1816, when Congress passed an act incorporating the Bank
of the United States. There was no express power in the Con-
stitution authorizing Congress to establish a national bank. The
validity of the statute was challenged and was decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States in M'Culoch v. Marylknd,6
Chief Justice Marshall writing the opinion. The power of Con-
gress was sustained, partly upon the ground that a national bank
might become necessary in the exercise of the power to carry on
a war. In that case, the Supreme Court laid down a proposition
of construction which has become the established law of the land.
We quote:
"But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow
the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."7
The question remains as to whether or not the exercise of
the proposed power to fix prices is plainly adapted to the success-
ful carrying on of a war; or, to put it more accurately, if Con-
gress should so decide, would the courts be compelled to say that
no reasonable ground can be assigned for the action of Con-
gress? We postpone the discussion of this question of abuse
of the discretion vested in Congress, for the reason that its
answer will be found in the same considerations with which we
will hereafter deal in connection with the due process clause.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
But even if the legislation is appropriate to the carrying on
of a war, it still could not stand if it invaded any of the consti-
tutional rights of a citizen. At the hearing it was suggested
that such legislation might deprive a person of his property
without due process of law, in contravention of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. In passing, it may be noted that the
6 4 Wheaton 316.
7 p. 421.
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same sentence provides that a person may not be deprived of
his life or liberty without due process. And when the Supreme
Court held, in the Selective Draft Cases8 that a citizen might
be deprived of his liberty or his life by an order of the Presi-
dent, in order to win a war, there is small room to argue that
the use of property of another citizen cannot be regulated in
order to win the same war. But because the due process clause
is a bogy in the minds of many lawyers and most laymen, we
proceed with the discussion.
The Supreme Court of the United States has steadfastly
declined to define due process of law. The Supreme Court has
declared its policy to be that in ascertaining the intent and ap-
plication of that phrase, it will do so "by the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for deci-
sion shall require."9 We do know, however, some things about
due process. We know that the clause is a flexible one. It is
quite true, as suggested at the hearings, that the existence of
war does not suspend constitutional guaranties, and that the con-
stitution is a "law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace."' 0 But we also know that what is due process under one
set of circumstances may not be due process under another set
of circumstances." So while the constitutional guaranties are
not suspended during the time of war, due process of law is
always considered in the light of attendant circumstances, and
the existence of a war is a circumstance which the courts have
aways considered.
That the circumstance of war has a vital bearing upon con-
s 245 U. S. 366.
9 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104.
lo Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
11 For example, the State of Nebraska passed a Bank Guaranty Law in
the year 1909. Certain banks contended that the statute deprived them
of their property without due process of law. This contention was denied
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1910 (Shallenberger v. First
State Bank, 219 U. S. 114), for the reasons given in the case of Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, where the Supreme Court said, "It
may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the
great public needs." (p. 111.) Notwithstanding this adjudication in 1910,
another action contesting the law was brought in 1928, the banks contend-
ing that conditions had so changed that the law then deprived the banks of
their property without due process. While relief was denied, the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized the proposition that there may be
such a change in circumstances that a law may be valid at one time and
invalid at another. (Abie State Bank v. Nebraska, 282 U. S. 765.)
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stitutional rights has been adjudicated by the Supreme Court
of the United States in a number of cases. In Schenek v. United
States,12 the defendant had been indicted for circulating docu-
ments intending to induce men to resist the draft. The defense
was that the statute under which he was indicted was uncon-
stitutional, in that it violated the First Amendment to the Con-
sitution, protecting the freedom of speech and of the press. The
Supreme Court held that while in times of peace the defendant
might have been protected by the constitutional guaranty, the
statute was valid as a war measure. The Court held:
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as pro-
tected by any constitutional right."13
Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, decided June 1,
1931,14 in holding that a Minnesota statute designed to suppress
malicious publications was violative of the fundamental guaran-
ties of the Constitution, took occasion to say that in exceptional
cases there was a limitation on the freedom of the press, and
quoted and approved the above language of Justice Holmes.
Even a more pertinent and pointed statement was made by the
Supreme Court of the United States on May 25, 1931, in United
States v. Macintosh,15 in which case the Supreme Court denied
the privilege of naturalization to one who would not agree to
bear arms unless he believed the war was being conducted in
accord with his conception of right and wrong. Speaking of
the war power, the court said:
"From its very nature the war power, when necessity calls for its
exercise, tolerates no qualifications or limitations, unless found in the Con-
stitution or its applicable principles of international law. In the words of
John Quincy Adams,---'This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitu-
tional; but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the pro-
tection of liberty, property and of life.' To the end that war may not
result in defeat, freedom of speech may, by act of Congress, be curtailed
or denied so that the morale of the people and the spirit of the army may
not be broken by seditious utterances; freedom of the press curtailed to
preserve our military plans and movements from the knowledge of the
enemy; deserters and spies put to death without indictment or trial by
jury; ships and supplies requisitioned; property of alien enemies, there-
12 249 U. S. 47.
13 p. 52.
14 51 Sp. Ct. Rp. 625.
15 51 Sp. Ct. Rp. 570.
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tofore under the protection of the Constitution, seized without process and
converted to the public use without compensation and without due process
of law in the ordinary sense of that term; prices of food and other neces-
sities of life fixed or regulated; railways taken over and operated by the
government; and other drastic powers, wholly inadmissible in time of
peace, exercised to meet the emergencies of war."
There are a great many other cases to this effect, but these
are sufficient to demonstrate that the existence of war is a cir-
cumstance which must be considered in determining whether
the power of Congress is appropriately exercised, or whether
the constitutional guaranties of the citizens have been invaded.
We also know that due process of law involves more than the
proposition of confiscation of property. We are not here con-
cerned with the question of the taking of private property for
public use without fair compensation, because if a citizen is per-
mitted to earn a fair return on his property, there can be no
question of confiscation. What we are concerned with is free-
dom of contract, which is within the protection of the due pro-
cess clause. That is to say, the government has no power to fix
and regulate prices charged by a purely private business for its
products in times of peace.1 6 Can this power, denied to the
government in time of peace, be exercised by the government in
time of war? The answer to the question will be found in an
inquiry into whether there is a reasonable ground for the exer-
cise of that power in time of war. If the public good-the suc-
cessful carrying on of the war-will be reasonably aided by such
price fixing regulation, then it is within the power of the gov-
ernment, and is not a denial of due process.
It would be sufficient, if this were an ordinary lawsuit, to
direct attention to the fact that the Supreme Court of the United
States no later than May 25, 1931, not only said that during time
of war, "ships and supplies (may be) requisitioned," but also
deliberately and expressly stated that "prices of food and other
necessities of life (may be) fixed or regulated," which answers
the precise question we are discussing.17 There is another deci-
sion, that of Block v. Hirsh,18 that is squarely in point. During
the late war Congress passed an act providing that tenants in
16 Wolff Company v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522; Tyson & Brother
v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418; Ribnich v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350; Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525.
17 United States v. Macintosh, supra, note 15.
38 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135.
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the District of Columbia might not be ousted from apartments,
if they were willing to pay a rent which was to be fixed by a
public commission. The act declared that it was made necessary
by the emergencies growing out of the war. Property owners
contended that this act deprived them of the right to contract,
fixed rentals for civilians, and deprived them of their property
without due process of law. The Supreme Court sustained the
law on the ground that "A limit in time, to tide over a passing
trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a
permanent change."'19 And likewise the Supreme Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of the Adamson Law passed in 1916,
which fixed the wages that railroads might pay their employes.20
In the Wolff Packing Company case, supra, the question arose
as to the power of the state to fix wages in times of peace. The
Supreme Court denied the right, but referring to the Adamson
Law case, and the Washington rent law cases, said:
"It is enough to say that the great temporary public exigencies recog-
nized by all and declared by Congress, were very different from that upon
which the control under this act is asserted."21
There is another line of cases which come to the same end. It
has been many times held, with reference to public utilities,
whose rates are subject to state control in time of peace, that
the government does not have power to take over the general
management of the properties. For example, in Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission,2 2 de-
cided in 1922 by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was
held:
"It must never be forgotten that while the State may regulate with a
view of enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not the owner of the
property of public utility companies and is not clothed with the general
power of management incident to ownership."
See, also, to the same effect Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co.,24 Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin.2 5
19 P. 157.
20 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332.
21 P. 542.
22 262 U. S. 276, 289.
24 209 U. S. 108.
25 238 U. S. 491. These cases have to do with the situation where the
properties are individually owned, and the power of government is exercised
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Despite this lack of power in time of peace, it will be recalled
that the government did take over and operate the railroads and
telephone and telegraph companies during the recent war. This
act of the government was sustained by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota,26
where the Supreme Court said:
"The complete and undivided character of the war power of the United
States is not disputable." Selective Draft Law Cases; Ex parte Milligan;
Legal Tender Cases; Stewart v. Kahn.
In Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota,27 the telephone com-
pany challenged the power of the war President to take posses-
sion and assume control of all of the telegraph and telephone
systems in the United States. The government paid a rental to
the telephone companies, and the earnings from the systems
accrued to the United States. The Postmaster General fixed the
schedule of rates throughout the United States. The power of
the President to do this was challenged, but the Supreme Court
sustained the exercise of this drastic power, and said:
"That under its war power Congress possessed the right to confer upon
the President the authority which it gave him we think needs nothing here
but statement, as we have disposed of that subject North Dakota Railroad
Rate Case. And the completeness of the war power under which the au-
thority was exerted and by which completeness its exercise is to be tested
suffices, we think, to dispose of the many other contentions urged as to the
want of power in Congress to confer upon the President the authority
which it gave him."'28
The power of the United States government, in time of war,
to require its citizens to serve with the colors, and in connection
with that service, to go beyond the confines of the United States,
has been settled. The Universal Draft Act of 1917 was chal-
lenged in Selective Draft Law Cases.29 The Supreme Court of
the United States sustained the power of the government to re-
quire its citizens to serve in time of war. The American Legion
agrees with the principle and the policy of the selective draft;
only as to rates. The government, like the states, may of course own, and
therefore manage as owners, property which customarily is owned by
individuals, such as banks, grain elevators or retail fuel stores. Green v.
Frazier, 253 U. S. 233; Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217
26 250 U. S. 135.
27 250 U. S. 163.
28 p. 183.
29 245 U. S. 366.
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yet it must be conceded that this is the most drastic exercise of
power of which government is capable. It is the power to re-
quire men to leave their families and homes, and to risk life
itself on the seas and on the battlefield. In so doing, the soldier
or sailor gives up his constitutional rights to a trial by jury,
freedom of speech, and many other of the most sacred consti-
tutional rights. Many other cases dealing with the powers of
Congress in time of war have been decided, and the courts have
never, to our knowledge, denied any reasonable power that Con-
gress might see fit to exercise in time of war.30
30 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, is not an exception; in that case the
Supreme Court held that a civilian could not be deprived of his liberty
without a trial by jury, unless in the actual theater of war, and when the
civil courts no longer functioned. If a civilian can be detained during the
emergency of war, manifestly it serves no useful public purpose to sub-
stitute a court-martial for a jury at his ultimate trial.
The Fourteenth Amendment denies to the states the power to deprive a
person of his property without due process. Essentially the same question
of the proper exercise of governmental power-due process of law-is pre-
sented by the cases decided by the Supreme Court which have sustained
state statutes which interfered with the right of contract. There are a
great many of these cases. A few will suffice to illustrate the comprehen-
sive powers of government in this respect. These cases will dispel the
thought that due process of law bars any governmental interference with
the right of private contract. If a proper governmental purpose is served
by such interference, due process of law does not forbid it. In determining
what is a public need, there is a wide discretion left with the legislature.
The absolute prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquor and of cigarettes,
which of course, is a drastic interference with the right of contract, has
been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States because reason-
able men do believe that the consumption of liquor and cigarettes is detri-
mental to the public welfare. (Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 625; Gundling
v. Chicago, 117 U. S. 183.) And so it has been held that the sale of arti-
ficially colored oleomargarine, although not in itself harmful to the health,
can be prohibited by the state because it might tend to deceive the public.
(Capital City Dairy Co. v. Attorney General, 183 U. S. 238.) The charges
for the storage of grain in terminal elevators have been regulated, which,
of course, is an interference with the right of contract. (Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113.) There is no business in which there is keener competition
than in fire insurance, that is to say, every small community has an agent
that represents a number of companies. Yet the premium which an insur-
ance company may charge for the writing of a fire insurance policy, in
time of peace, has been limited. (German Alliance v. Lewis, 233 U. S.
389.) If necessary, property can be taken for public use without any com-
pensation. For example, if a building stands in the path of a fire and it is
believed that the destruction of the building may stop the fire, the building
may be destroyed by public authority without any compensation. (Bowditch
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A government which has the power to draft its soldiers and
sailors; a government which has the power to fix the rents which
the citizens of Washington shall pay to their landlord; a gov-
ernment which has the power to fix the wages which a railroad
shall pay to its employes; a government which has the power
to take over the entire management of the transportation and
communication systems of the country-as has been decided-
certainly has the power to prescribe the price which its citizens
shall be charged for the necessities of life during the same
emergency.
Is THERE ANY FAIR REASON FOR THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION?
In considering all constitutional questions, it is an axiom that
a wide discretion is vested in Congress. If Congress should
deem that the legislation now proposed is an appropriate means
to assist in the carrying on of war, the courts would not hold it
to be unconstitutional if any fair reason can be assigned in sup-
port of it. While this is a field that is more legislative than
legal in character, we take the liberty of suggesting several rea-
sons which may properly be assigned in support of such legis-
lation:
(a) Probably the strongest reason that can be advanced in
support of this proposal is the essential fairness and justice of
it. War is a community effort. The greatest army ever assem-
bled would be dissipated in thirty days if there were not a
greater army back of it. Food stuffs must be grown, and must
be conserved; raw materials must be manufactured; and all
must be fed in a constant stream to the armies at the front. It
takes soldiers and sailors and farmers and labor and capital to
conduct a war. It is a partnership enterprise. 31
v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16.) A municipal ordinance has been sustained which
prohibits the doing of laundry work between certain hours. (Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 27.) A man may be prevented from building an apart-
ment house with his own money, on ground that he owns, unless it is located
as prescribed by a zoning ordinance; here is a direct and drastic interfer-
ence with the right of contract and property, sustained only because of the
public convenience. (Euclid v. Amber Realty Company, 272 U. S. 265.)
The state may also prescribe maximum hours of labor for women. (Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412.) All of these cases, and many more that might be
cited, demonstrate that the right of contract may be interfered with by
public authority whenever it may reasonably be believed that the interfer-
ence will serve some public need.
31 We believe no one who had any part in the government during the
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A war can be conducted by volunteers, both at the front and
behind the lines; or it can be conducted by the power of govern-
ment. If the government recruits its armies by the exercise of
power-compels the service of its citizens in uniform, and pre-
scribes their wage-it is no more than fair and just that the
other partners in the enterprise be subjected to the same gov-
ernmental power. It is not fair, by force of law, to require
man-power to serve at the front for a living wage, and to per-
mit the man-power which serves behind the lines to accumulate
great fortunes from exorbitant profits. There can be no better
reason assigned for a law, and no firmer constitutional founda-
tion upon which it can rest, than that it is essentially fair and
just.
(b) The most cogent guide for the requirements of the fu-
ture is the needs of the past. In order to carry the recent war
to a successful conclusion, it was found indispensable to exer-
cise general powers of price fixing and the establishment of pri-
orities. It is our understanding that the identical powers now
proposed to be authorized by law, were in fact exercised in the
closing months of that war. The powers may not have been so
widely used as is now proposed, but the quality of the power
exercised was identical, the subjugation of the right of contract
to the needs of the government. In the face of this historical
fact, we assert with confidence that no court will ever hold that
Congress is either arbitrary or exceeds its discretionary power,
if it sees fit to authorize in advance what the past has demon-
strated to be necessary in order to win a war. In fact, the only
argument that occurs to us in opposition to such authorization
is that it may not be necessary; that the powers of Congress
recent war will challenge this statement. But if there be a lingering doubt
in the minds of any one as to the correctness of the proposition that war is
a community effort, it would be dispelled by a reading of the recent book of
General Pershing. A very considerable part of his time and effort, particu-
larly during the first year of the war, was devoted to a mobilization of
supplies and labor and material. On page 168 he makes this statement:
"The world war was a struggle involving all national resources, and
that fact was particularly emphasized by a close range study of the many
requirements for preparation. Every industry and every art, beginning
with the farms and mines, must contribute its full share, and every citizen
must fulfill his obligation to serve. America's part in the contest will be
successful only by the combined efforts of the armies and the people. The
man with the rifle was merely the privileged representative of a thousand
others who were as deeply concerned in the result as he was."
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and the President to carry on a war are now plenary, and a
statute can only serve to restrict them. However, restriction
can be avoided by the careful use of general terms, and it will
serve the purpose of notifying our citizens, and the world, that
when the United States goes to war, all of its resources are
mobilized, and that exorbitant profits will not be tolerated.
(c) In ordinary times, the economic law of supply and de-
mand, reinforced by statutes that prevent combinations in re-
straint of trade, is relied upon to protect the public from mo-
nopoly. But war throws out of kelter the law of supply and
demand, or rather, it disturbs its normal balance. A consider-
able part of the population of the country is withdrawn from
constructive work and is engaged in destructive work. As a
result, there is a temporary but artificial stimulus of the demand
for commodities, and a temporary but artificial constriction of
the supply. The experiences of the last war have demonstrated
that the law of supply and demand, supplemented as it is by
statutes against monopoly, is entirely incapable of protecting
the public against extortion. Many prices increased to more
than twice the pre-war levels, and great fortunes were amassed
because of the fact that the law of supply and demand had been
aborted by the war. Dealing with purely private industries, and
in time of peace, Chief Justice Taft in the Wolff Packing Com-
pany Case, supra,3 2 said that the government might regulate
the price of the commodities supplied by certain businesses on
account of "the indispensable nature of the service and the exor-
bitant charges and arbitrary control to which the public might
be subjected without regulation."33
(d) In any army that is recruited, there will be soldiers who
leave dependents behind them. During the last war, a provi-
sion was made for an allotment of a certain portion of the sol-
dier's pay for their support. The government fixes the wages of
such a soldier. Half of it is alloted for the support of his wife
and child. If the government exercises no control over what
profiteers may charge that wife and child for the necessities of
life, the pay of the soldier becomes no longer adequate to meet
the plan of the government-a living wage. Take an ordinary
instance: A man with wife and child leaves his civilian em-
ployment, waives his exemptions, and enters the service. He
32 Wolff Packing Company case, supra, note 16.
33 262 U. S. 522, 538.
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is paid $30 a month, half of which he sends to his wife. As long
as the dollar is worth a dollar, his wife can make out. But when,
as happened in the recent war, the dollars which he sent home
became only worth fifty cents, then a great injustice has been
done. Wives and children must be cared for. When the gov-
ernment fixes a schedule of wages for its soldiers and sailors,
predicated on a dollar being worth a hundred cents, it should
have the power to preserve that value. It cannot do so, unless
it fixes the price which may be charged to the dependents for
the necessities of life.
(e) It is difficult to believe that any citizen would con-
sciously desire a war on account of the profit that might come
from it. Yet people are unconsciously affected by the matter of
profit or loss. That wars in the past have been immensely pro-
fitable to many of those who have been unable to serve, is a fact
known to every one. It is probably true that, subconsciously,
the public opinion which has so much to do with war or peace
is affected by the knowledge that if war does come, it will be a
time of great prosperity for those who are unable to serve.
Whether this be sound or not, a great many reasonable men
entertain this belief; and if reasonable men can fairly believe
that taking the profit out of war will have a tendency to prevent
war, then this law can be immediately justified on the most
fundamental constitutional power, and that is the power of Con-
gress to preserve and protect its peoples from the horrors of
war.
(f) There is another reason. During the last war large
sums of money were properly expended, both by the government
and by civilian societies, to maintain the morale of the soldier.
No one knows better than soldiers the tremendous part which
morale plays in the life of a fighting man. If the morale of a
soldier is crushed, he is little better than useless. The soldier
with a strong morale is worth a dozen soldiers whose morale is
shattered. We can think of nothing that does more to affect the
morale of the soldier than the knowledge that his wife or his
dependents are denied the comforts of life while the companions
of his school days are amassing fortunes.
(g) The present depression presents another strong reason
for the passage of some such law. It will not be denied, we
think, that Congress has the power to pass any reasonable meas-
ure that tends to relieve the acute conditions through which we
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are now passing. The primary function of the Federal Reserve
System is to prevent the panics that arise from a rigid currency.
What is the reason for the present depression? Men may differ
about this, but many reasonable men entertain the belief that
its underlying cause is the undue inflation of war times. That
deflation must follow an abnormal inflation is a mathematical
certainty. That deflation is accompanied by public distress can-
not be denied. If the exorbitant profits are taken out of war,
there will be no inflation; if there is no inflation, there will be
no deflation.
(h) That reasonable men may believe that such a proposal
will serve the public good, is proven by the list of distinguished
men who have approved of the policy of this legislation. Presi-
dent Wilson exercised such power during the war; and the three
occupants of the Presidential chair since the war have expressly
approved this proposal. The first President of this country dis-
approved of the profiteering that accompanied the prosecution
of the Revolutionary War. The United States Chamber of Com-
merce, in 1917, expressly acknowledged the necessity and power
of the government "to control prices." That other nations, such
as Great Britain and France and Germany, have taken steps to
prevent a recurrence of the economic situation attendant upon
the last war, is strong proof of the propriety of some such legis-
lation. In Block v. Hirsh,34 Mr. Justice Holmes, in sustaining
the Washington Rent Law Cases, supported his opinion in part
by saying:
"It is enough that we are not warranted in saying that legislation that
has been resorted to for the same purpose all over the world, is futile or
has no reasonable relation to the relief sought. Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire."35
(i) There is a law of physics that says in substance that
something cannot be had from nothing. If men behind the lines
amass great fortunes in time of war, those fortunes come from
somewhere. War does not increase the national resources, but
decreases them. The wealth of a nation is always less after a
war than before it. Great fortunes were amassed during the
recent war. They came from somewhere. They came, of course,
from the great common people. The war time profiteers created
no wealth; they were simply acute enough to centralize it. And
34 Blockv . Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135.
35 p. 158.
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by doing so, they took from the men and women, in the lines
and back of them, who were not engaged in amassing wealth.
To prevent the cunning and avaricious from capitalizing the
misfortunes of those who are compelled to serve, is certainly a
proper end of government.
The war power is as elastic as the law of self-defense, and like
the law of self-defense, it is the first law of the land. An exami-
nation of the various laws enacted under that power, and the
attitude of courts toward that power, leads us to the conclusion
that the courts will not interfere with any enactment of Con-
gress, designed to aid in the successful carrying on of war, un-
less it is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable man
can say that it is appropriate to the end designed. In our
opinion, the proposed legislation is within the power of Con-
gress.
We believe that business men will not insist on more than a
fair profit during war times. Most of them would prefer to
keep their businesses running to capacity, with a six per cent
return, rather than make an eighty per cent return, and be
compelled to return seventy-five per cent of the excess profit in
taxes, and be bothered by tax-collectors and inspectors for years
to follow. That the United States Chamber of Commerce ap-
proved the principle, and that its members co-operated loyally
with the war-time commissions, is submitted as proof of this
statement.
METHODS OF ExERCISING THE POWER CONFERRED, AFTER THE
EMERGENCY HAS ARISEN
Members of the Commission, during the hearing, invited sug-
gestions as to a practical method of carrying out the powers
conferred by the proposed statute. Upon this question it is
very doubtful whether this committee can be of any service to
the Commission. None of the members of this committee had
the opportunity of observing the operations of the various war
boards which functioned during the recent war. Some of the
witnesses before the Commission have an intimate knowledge
of the workings of such boards, and a large grasp of business
methods, and have a much greater source of information upon
which to draw, than do the members of this committee. But in
order to respond to the invitation of the Commission, and with
great hesitation, we make the following observations as to the
possible method of exercise of power when it is called into play.
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Such luxuries as tobacco, theaters, pleasure automobiles, and
a great many other similar articles, might well be eliminated
from the equation for the purpose of simplicity of administra-
tion; upon these could be placed a tax, either a sales tax or an
excess profits tax, which would help make up the depletion in
revenues which will necessarily be occasioned by the elimination
of excess profits on necessaries.
In formulating a method for the exercise of the power there
are two principal matters, we take it, to be considered: In the
first place, the plan should, as nearly as may be, allow to each
individual engaged in the production, manufacture, or distribu-
tion of essential commodities, the actual cost of the service ren-
dered, plus an allowance for the depreciation of property en-
gaged in the enterprise, plus a reasonable return on the capital
invested. Second, the plan must not be so cumbersome as to be
unworkable. It is probably true here, as it is in many other
affairs of life, that exact justice must to some extent give way
to practical considerations.
It has been suggested that there be determined the invest-
ment of each citizen in his particular business; ascertain the
cost incurred by him in the operation of that business, and add
thereto a fixed percentage of the investment to cover deprecia-
tion and profit. This seems fair on its face, but it is very
doubtful whether this plan is practicable. Certainly the courts
as at present constituted, with their present procedure and
rights of appeal, could not hope to discharge this task in any
reasonable time. It is constitutionally possible to provide addi-
tional courts, charged with the exclusive duty of ascertaining
such facts, as was done in the case of the Interstate Commerce
Court some years ago and as is now done with the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. There need be no appellate
tribunals, unless thought desirable, for the right of appeal is not
a constitutional right 36 The plan of separate courts for that
purpose is much more feasible if the ascertainment of invest-
ments in individual businesses is attempted, but it would seem
that the task of ascertaining the underlying facts as to every
factory and wholesaler and retailer in the United States would
be unending. There is one other serious objection,-such plan
would provide different prices for the same commodity. It is,
of course, a known fact that the cost of operation varies with the
36 Luckenbach v. United States, 272 U. S. 533.
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particular business; that is to say, an efficiently managed and
up-to-date flour mill with low power costs may be able to keep
its manufacturing cost to 40c a barrel of flour; the less efficient
and less efficiently operated flour mill, of small capacity, and
with higher power costs, might very well have an actual manu-
facturing cost of 60c a barrel. These two mills must compete
for the same civilian business. It is said that if you fixed a
lower price for the barrel of flour from the efficiently operated
mill, the less efficiently operated mill either loses its civilian
trade, or operates at a loss. One alternative, of course, is to fix
a price that will enable the smaller mill to make 6 per cent and
apply that barrel price to the larger mill, which will, of course,
result in the larger mill making 10 or 12 or 15 per cent profit.
But the milling business is highly competitive in time of peace,
and the smaller mills do operate under this handicap; they can
do so in time of war. The same dilemma is presented in the
effort to fix fire insurance rates, which must be uniform if the
small companies survive; the customary solution of the dilemma
is to fix a rate that will allow a reasonable profit to the average
company. A normal tax should be laid on the 6 per cent profit,
and the excess profits of the more efficient operator should be
recaptured by an excess profits tax.
Probably the simplest plan would be to make it a criminal
offense to charge a price for a commodity that reflected more
than a 6 per cent profit on the invested capital. The facts could
be ascertained from the income tax reports. Under the Excess
Profit Tax Laws of 1917 and 1918, a separate tax was levied
upon excessive profits, and profits were figured upon the invested
capital of the industry. Invested capital has been construed to
mean just what it says, the amount invested in the property,
and excludes inflated values.3 7 This would put upon each indi-
vidual, in making his income tax return, the burden of seeing
to it that his prices do not reflect an exorbitant profit upon the
pain of imprisonment. This offers the same objection as the
preceding one, in that it would prescribe varying prices among
different individuals for the same commodities, and result in the
strong and efficiently operated plants absorbing all of the busi-
ness. It is necessary in time of war that even the less efficiently
operated plants be run to capacity, and any plan that would
eliminate the small operator from the picture, should be avoided.
37 La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377.
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During the late war a percentage up to 75 per cent of the ex-
cess profits was absorbed by taxation. Under the taxing power
these rates could be adjusted so that there should be a tax of 90
per cent on all profits in excess of 6 per cent. This again would
be a simple method of adjustment, but would only serve in part
the end desired.
Perhaps the best method of all is the establishment of one or
more boards whose duty it would be to fix prices for the various
commodities. This puts tremendous power in the hands of indi-
viduals, but in war times such becomes necessary. Such indi-
viduals would have no more power than a colonel of a regiment
has over the lives of the men under him, and it is a necessary
concomitant of the proposition that wars cannot be successfully
conducted by debating societies.
If this were done, the President should have power, through
boards, to fix prices today predicated on prices that existed six
months or more ago. It is very unlikely that there will ever be
a war without some premonition thereof. With such a statute
in existence as the one proposed, some people might begin to get
their houses in order long before the actual declaration of war,
and gradually increase prices on the theory that when the date
came for freezing the prices, they would be ready. It would be
impracticable, from a diplomatic standpoint, to exercise this war
power a considerable period in advance of war. That in itself
would be nearly as serious a declaration as would the mobiliza-
tion of military forces. But in the Federal government there is
no constitutional objection to retroactive legislation, as is indi-
cated by the fact that nearly all of our tax legislation is retro-
active. The President, through a board familiar with the par-
ticular industry, could look far enough back into the past to
enable him to determine that the normal pre-war level of the
price of flour was predicated upon a milling cost of 40c, a selling
cost of 20c, and a milling profit of 5c. He could look far enough
back to see that the pre-war level of the price of wheat was a
dollar a bushel. He could proceed to fix the price of wheat at a
dollar a bushel, and fix the price of a barrel of flour at the price
of 4.6 bushels of wheat, plus 65c, or a price of $5.25 a barrel,
even though the prospect of war had stimulated the current
price to $8 a barrel. Since the milling cost varies, and in order
to keep the smaller mills in operation, the board should probably
fix the price of a barrel of flour at $5.50. This would then
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become the temporary frozen price, until hearings could be held,
at which a permanent war-time price (subject to change) could
be fixed with the same general considerations in mind. The so-
called permanent price-the one fixed after the hearing-should
of course be subject to change if conditions demanded it. If
raw materials were required which must be imported, and there-
fore not subject to the power of the United Sates, the price
fixing order could be so worded as to allow for an automatic
adjustment as the price of such imported raw materials went up
or down. If labor costs increased, or if there became sound
reason for increasing the price of wheat, the price of flour could
be adjusted accordingly. This plan, of course, would result in
some lack of uniformity; it would mean that the more efficiently
operated plants would make more than 6 per cent, while the less
efficiently operated might have to either increase their efficiency
or get along with a little less than 6 per cent. But this is a con-
dition that exists in industry today; the weak are competing with
the strong, and are getting along. A large life insurance com-
pany with millions of policies outstanding necessarily has a less
overhead cost per policy than a small company. Nevertheless
they do compete, just as the less efficiently operated flour mills
are competing with the more efficiently operated ones. But the
spread is not great, and while high class mills might make a
little more than 6 per cent, such a plan should at least prevent
the exorbitant profits and the amassing of great fortunes which
followed in the wake of the recent war.
The statute should be as plenary and as flexible as possible,
It would be well to provide therein that the President be author-
ized to take steps now, either through existing or new officials,
to set up the personnel for the emergency, so that there would
not be months of delay after the emergency arises. Such officials
would now ascertain what boards would be necessary in event
of war. Such officials should be required to keep informed as to
the men who would be available and willing to serve on such
boards, so that when war was declared, members of such boards
would be able immediately to assume their responsibilities. Prices
should be automatically frozen, pending the hearings before
such boards, at the prices existing as of a date to be fixed by
the president; summary hearings should be provided by each
board for those representing the industry affected, and at the
conclusion thereof, a price fixed which in the judgment of the
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board would reflect a fair profit for that particular commodity;
the board, of course, reserving the right to change that price
from time to time as conditions might require it.
CONCEDING THE POWER, IS SUCH A PLAN CONSTITUTIONAL Ex-
ERCISE THEREOF?
If the government has power to fix prices in war time, by any
method, there is no reason to doubt that the suggested plan is
constitutional. The plan proposes, as has been seen, two steps,
one a temporary expedient to brook over the time until hearings
can be held and a fair price fixed; the second step, the fixing
of prices after a hearing. The first step-freezing the prices
as they exist or as of a date some time prior-is but a temporary
expedient to prevent extortion pending the hearings. It is
comparable to the restraining orders regularly issued by Courts
to preserve the status until there can be a hearing; courts can-
not take property without due process, and yet no one has or can
challenge the power of the Courts to issue orders, without notice,
which preserve the status until there can be a hearing. Nor do
we believe anyone can contend that he has been arbitrarily
deprived of his property when he is compelled to sell his goods
tomorrow for what he was willing to sell them for today, par-
ticularly since all prices of raw materials, manufacture and dis-
tribution, are frozen at the same time. But even so, he would
not be hurt much or for long, and the philosophy of Noble State
Bank v. Haskell,38 is that you can take a little of a man's prop-
erty without due process, but you can't take much. In that
case, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
said:
. .. there is no denying that by this law a portion of its prop-
erty might be taken without return to pay debts of a failing rival in busi-
ness. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the logical form of the objection, there
are more powerful considerations on the other side. In the first place it
is established by a series of cases that an ulterior public advantage may
justify a comparatively insignificant taking of private property for what,
in its immediate purpose, is a private use." 39
As to the second step-the permanent price-there is still less
question, for it has been fixed after a notice and hearing, and
is predicated upon a fair return. As to both the temporary and
38 219 U. S. 104.
39 p. 110.
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permanent price, it might be well to afford a hearing to an indi-
vidual merchant or factory owner, upon application, if his par-
ticular situation justifies individual treatment. Such applica-
tions would probably not be numerous, for individuals would
realize that if they tried to sell above the general price, they
would get no business. And certainly a poorly managed busi-
ness has no constitutional right to compel its more efficient com-
petitor to make an exorbitant profit. When prices are fixed,
particularly the temporary ones, they should be maximums; that
is, business men should be permitted to sell at a lesser price, if
for any reason, such as to meet competition, they so desired.
It is urged, however, that the legislation not be encumbered
with any of these details. If general power is conferred, all
details can be worked out by the President, and altered as cir-
cumstances warrant. If, however, it is thought desirable to
afford a court review of the findings of the boards-either as to
fact or only as to law-and separate courts are required for
such purpose, an act of Congress would be necessary to consti-
tute them. It is our judgment, however, that due process is
satisfied by the notice and hearing before the board, without
court review as to facts found by them on evidence. 40
40 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497.
EDITOR'S NOTE
Another step in The Legion's ten-year fight for legislation to
attain the Universal Draft was accomplished on March 7, when
the report of the findings of the War Policies Commission was
transmitted to the Congress by President Hoover.
The legislative steps requested by the report are:
1. Authority to "freeze" prices at the inception of war.
2. A law to confiscate ninety-five per cent of all war incomes
above normal, so that funds which escape price freezing can
contribute to the war cost.
3. A Constitutional amendment to specifically provide for
Congressional control of prices during war-time.
In addition the report recommends that detailed studies be
made of methods for mobilizing man-power and all national re-
sources, so that these may be promptly available when required
by war.
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